This is a response to Philip Duchastel's posting, Prolegomena to a Theory of Instructional Design, in the ITForum. I am at somewhat of a loss as to where to begin, because Philip covers so much ground in such a small space, and consequently I found it difficult to decipher his main message.
That said, it seems to me that his major thesis is the importance of integrating instructional theories into a common knowledge base. I strongly support this notion, and it has been a major theme of both volumes of Instructional Design Theories and Models. (Volume II should be available from Lawrence Erlbaum Associates in November.) What I personally would like to have seen more of in Philip's posting is strong arguments as to why such integration is needed (or even possible!) and ideas about how it might be accomplished.
In addition to this general concern, I also found a number of specific points about which I have some concerns, as well as many which I strongly support. In the remainder of this posting, I attempt to open the kind of dialogue Philip was encouraging. I do so by citing relevant parts of his posting before addressing each.
[quoting Duchastel's paper] A theory of instructional design is an organized set of prescriptions that assists in the preparation of instruction. On the face of it, a theory is but a descriptive tool that underlies a procedural model of design for the preparation of instruction.
I prefer to use the term "design theory" rather than "prescriptive theory" and "guidelines" rather than "prescriptions" because the latter terms have connotations of uniformity and rigidity, and as I have stated in Chapter I of Volume II, I believe that for fostering learning it is essential to have diversity, situationality, and flexibility in our guidance. Similarly, I would shy away from the term "procedural model of design" (even if you are referring to the ISD process rather than the instructional process, because procedural has connotations of linearity or rigidity, whereas I believe the design process is much more heuristic in nature).
A theory is a collection of choices made about what is important to consider.
I like this. It communicates the central role that values (or philosophy) play in our decisions about what to teach and how to teach it. But I hasten to add that it does not negate the importance of science and research (what works), it just acknowledges that the criteria we use to judge what works are based on our values.
The initial impression one gets from the new batch of theories anthologized by Reigeluth (1998a) is one of diversity: so many theories and so at odds with one another that one is left perplexed. My unease arises from the question, Is this a healthy situation, one where creativity is blossoming, or one where Babel reigns instead?--an admittedly value-laden question.
First of all, I don't believe any of the theories in either of the two volumes are at odds with one another. I see each as being appropriate for different situations, including differences in values of the key stakeholders (students, teachers, parents, etc.), which reflect differences in values of the theorists. I view these differences as complementary, not competitive or adversarial. They reflect the "requisite variety" (diversity) that needs to be incorporated into the kind of integrated instructional theory that Philip is advocating, because only that way will the theory be able to meet the needs and concerns (including values) of the end users.
Second of all, the issue of theories at odds with one another seems to me very different from theories in which "Babel reigns," the former being a matter of substantive differences, and the latter being primarily a matter of differing terminology used to convey similar ideas.
In his discussion of theories at odds with each other, Duchastel says:
Each theorist says in effect "This is what is important to pay attention to, this is what needs to be dealt with for successful instruction." For instance, elaboration theory (Reigeluth, 1998b) emphasizes contextualizing knowledge elements within their more holistic topical structures, whereas constructivism (as represented by Jonassen, 1998) emphasizes authentic problem-solving. Along the same lines, but from a different angle, some of the theories focus on conceptual outcomes of learning, while others deal with affective outcomes, and so on.
I don't see Philip's "for instances" as being at odds with one another. I think elaboration theory is very compatible with authentic problem solving, and I think the teaching of conceptual outcomes can be very compatible with and supportive of the teaching of affective outcomes.
Emphasis in theory-building is fine as long as it does not inadvertently reduce the scope of the theory.
I think the issue of scope is a bit more complex than Philip portrays it in this paragraph. It is multi-dimensional. True, the Kamradts deal only with attitudes, but they deal with all three domains: affective, cognitive, and behavioral, giving it a very broad scope on that dimension. ET does, contrary to his indication, have a clearly delimited scope, only it is primarily in that it deals only with scope and sequence decisions-a very different dimension. Also, its scope currently does not deal with the affective domain. I think that every design theory (and every descriptive theory for that matter), at this stage of our knowledge development, has to have a limited scope, though I suspect that eventually all these design theories will be synthesized into a single guidance system that will be highly situational.
Theory building is perhaps naturally open to applicability fuzziness.
I do agree with this, but it seems to me that this is a much broader issue than scope. Scope is only one way in which theories can be fuzzy. So I think there is some disconnect between this statement and what preceded it. The statements that follow it baffle me a bit, because I asked each theorist to explicate the preconditions for use of their theory, which is a manner of describing its scope. Granted, some did a better job of this than others, but Philip seems to treat scope as if it wasn't addressed at all by the theorists.
I want to argue here that the very direction of instructional design theorizing as foreseen in these important contemporary collections is mis-oriented. We need to seek the forest (out from behind the trees)--that is our mission.
I agree and disagree. I agree that integration of theories is an important activity, but without the individual theories there is nothing to integrate. This is a problem faced in General Systems Theory, wherein the systems design process needs to design each subsystem but also design the system that integrates them. It is somewhat of a chicken-and-egg problem, because each subsystem needs to be designed with the whole system in mind, so as to be compatible with all the subsystems with which it interacts. This means that the system and each of its subsystems need to be designed simultaneously and interactively and that their design needs to constantly evolve so as to better cohere as a system and to better meet the evolving needs and situations of its environment (clients, suprasystem, etc.).
Theoretical integration should currently be our prime challenge in instructional design.
With the above qualification, I do agree with this.
Pluralism may well be a mistake of grand proportion...
It seems to me that what Philip has ignored in the discussion leading up to this conclusion is the important role of situationalities and differing values. But I also think his discussion overlooks that several ways to accomplish any specific goal for a specific situation and value set in fact often differ so little in terms of preferability that the differences are negligible.
It is imperative to refrain from goal-setting, which is a main muddling factor. ... Instructional designers, and instructional design theory, should have no say in what is taught.
In fact, instructional design theory does not have any say in what is taught, for it is a body of knowledge that concerns how to teach, as distinct from curriculum theory, which is concerned with what to teach. But practitioners need guidance for both what to teach and how to teach it. That is why our ISD models all address both in their process guidance. Furthermore, there are interdependencies between what to teach and how to teach it. This provides a strong rationale for integrating curriculum and instruction, for they are like two subsystems in a system, inextricably interrelated. Integrating them seems consistent with Duchastel's advocacy of integrating instructional theories. The statement quoted above seems much like saying that the Kamradts' theory of attitudinal development should have no say about skill development. This is counter to Duchastel's argument that greater integration is needed. And keep in mind that guidance offered about what to teach, based on different values and needs, could be offered merely as input to a decision-making process that involves all stakeholders, as opposed to being the final decision itself that a designer, acting alone, is required to accept.
What this stance amounts to is a repudiation of the place of values in instructional design theory. It should strive to establish itself as beyond values. Remaining stuck in the value-laden politics of education will prevent it from attaining its full potential as an artificial science.
Even if we were to accept Philip's position insisting on complete separation of curriculum and instruction, Chapter 1 of Volume II also discusses the importance of values for making decisions about HOW to teach. Which methods are chosen inevitably depends on which criteria you use to judge the merits of each method, and those criteria reflect your values about instruction. Duchastel has not addressed this, and I strongly believe that design theory, by its nature, must always consider values, for they are an inescapable aspect of design practice (the practice of design).
The muddled scene comes from the fact that these three "facets" of learning are not integrated into a comprehensive theory that could deal with their relationships.
I strongly agree with this.
Skiing and the multiplication table may have a lot in common (both are skills) and not much in common with genetic models or statistical analyses (rather more complex), but all have to be dealt with by instructional design theory, building on how we assume each is learned. We simply cannot wait for psychology to consolidate its own learning theories--we need to charge ahead.
I agree with the main point here--that we cannot wait. But on a more picky level, I think of multiplication tables as information to be memorized, not as skills to be applied. There is a skill of multiplying, but memorizing the tables is a different kind of learning. Furthermore, I would say that a method of statistical analysis is a skill to be applied to different situations, and in that sense is similar to skiing or multiplication. Memorizing the method is, of course, a different kind of learning, but not the ultimate goal teachers should pursue.
Learning theory is itself in need of strong consolidation.
I certainly agree with this, and that we shouldn't wait for psychology to consolidate its own learning theories.
...mathematical procedures for instance (as indeed many things) can be approached in two distinct ways: by rote or through modeling.
I think they can be approached in more than two ways, and I would say that these two are not the most important distinction to make. Also, I think they even represent two different dimensions of distinction. Rote versus meaningful would be one possible dimension of distinction and expository (including modeling) versus discovery would be another.
I believe a major problem in instructional design theory is an evident lack of critical comparisons between theories.
What is the purpose of the critical comparisons? Is it to reject some and accept others, "intellectual confrontation" that results in the survival of the fittest theory? I think formative evaluation is far more important right now than summative, because the new paradigm of instructional theory is so new that its greatest need right now is further development of each theory. So I would endorse constructive criticism done for formative purposes.
I'm not sure critical analyses will result in consolidation. Critical syntheses may be more useful to that end.
...more cross-fertilization and dialogue.
This I endorse, but confrontation is very different from dialogue. Philip seems to be equating the two.
...instruction is an intentional effort to influence the thinking of another person.
I find this definition too broad, for it encompasses persuasion as well as instruction. It conveys a degree of manipulation that is often not present and not desirable in instruction.
Motivation is essential to consider in instructional design in order to eliminate it from instruction.
How can motivation be an essential part of instructional design and not be an essential part of instruction? I would like to see clarification of this.
Our values perhaps cover up our lack of a desirable set of rules of instruction.
Philip seems to be inconsistent here by saying that the set of rules is desirable and at the same time too rigid. I would like to see clarification of this, also.
But remember that content decisions do not belong to the instructional designer. The meta-rules of instructional design theory must deal with this content / approach to instruction interaction...
Isn't this also a contradiction: instructional design theory must deal with it, but it doesn't belong?
Instruction needs viewing as both process and product.
Don't instructional theories do this already? How would they need to change to take this view. I fail to see what the implication is.
The more explicit these rules can become, the better, while however preserving generality of application.
I'm afraid that the more explicit the rules are, the less generality of application they will necessarily have. I have already commented on many of the other prescriptions in this section.
A good measure of synthesis is needed now in the field to counter the creative but unruly diversity that is emerging from instructional design theory.
I agree that synthesis (more than analysis!) is needed, but I think that diversity is healthy and even necessary for the advancement of instructional design theory. I don't see it as unruly.
As a final comment, I would like to applaud Philip Duchastel for initiating a dialogue about integrating instructional-design theories. I strongly agree that such integration is needed and encourage him and others to specifically address why such integration is needed, whether it in fact is possible, and how it might be accomplished. While I have attempted to grapple with these issues to some extent in Volume II, I think our field can benefit from considerably more attention to this area.